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SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY AND THE CURIOUS TURN
TOWARD BOARD PRIMACY
GRANT HAYDEN* & MATTHEW T. BODIE**
Abstract
Corporate law is consumed with a debate over shareholder democ-
racy. The conventional wisdom counsels that shareholders should
have more voice in corporate governance, in order to reduce agency
costs and provide democratic legitimacy. A second set of theorists,
described as “board primacists,” advocates against greater share-
holder democracy and in favor of increased board discretion. These
theorists argue that shareholders need to delegate their authority in
order to provide the board with the proper authority to manage the
enterprise and avoid short-term decision making.
In the last few years, the classical economic underpinnings of
corporate law have been destabilized by a growing recognition that
shareholders are not a homogeneous group of wealth maximizers.
This recognition has, among other things, undercut the arguments
made in support of the typical corporate structure where sharehold-
ers alone possess the right to vote in corporate elections. Board
primacy seems well-positioned to retheorize corporate law to adapt
to this new reality. In their analyses of the issue, however, board
primacy theorists have conflated two very different aspects of group
decision processes: the responsiveness of the governance system and
the composition of the electorate. This confusion ends up putting
many board primacy theorists in the curious position of moving away
from the public choice emphasis on preference aggregation toward a
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more civic republican model of less responsive, more deliberative
decision making.
By restricting the franchise, board primacists have detached their
governance structures from the underlying desires of their constitu-
ents without substituting anything in their place. We argue, however,
that the breakdown of this particular distinction between sharehold-
ers and other constituents could mean that we should investigate
treating other constituents more like shareholders, rather than the
other way around.
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1. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932).
2. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 568-69 (2003) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Director Primacy].
3. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 833 (2005).
4. Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L. 887 (2007).
5. See, e.g., Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 2, at 565-68.
6. See, e.g., Lucien Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to the Takeover Law and Regulatory
Competition, 87 VA. L. REV. 111, 164 (2001).
7. See Victor Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95
HARV. L. REV. 597 (1982) (describing reform proposals).
8. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Politics of Corporate Governance, 18 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 671 (1995).
INTRODUCTION
Shareholder democracy is back from the dead. Dating back to
Berle and Means’ autopsy of corporate democracy,1 it had long been
assumed that the shareholder franchise was relatively meaning-
less—a de jure power with little de facto effect.2 Building on reforms
from the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, however, scholars have taken an
ever-more aggressive stance towards shareholder empowerment.3
Institutional shareholders and the advocacy groups that represent
them have become powerful players in corporate boardrooms and in
the public markets.4 With this new emphasis on the role of share-
holders, it is only natural to focus on the power to vote—which is,
after all, the power to select those who control the company. Given
the course of corporate law scholarship, strengthening the share-
holder franchise is the logical next step.
Corporate law centers on the relationship between the corpora-
tion, the board, and shareholders. And the primary concern of corpo-
rate law scholarship has been to reduce the agency costs imposed
upon shareholders by delegating those powers to the board and its
appointed officers.5 Successive waves of scholarship have carried in
new suggestions for reform, such as the facilitation of the takeover
market,6 the expanded use of independent directors,7 and greater
reliance on intermediaries.8 It only makes sense for reformers to
look to the franchise, as it is the direct structural power source for
shareholders. Shareholders can vote out directors and officers;
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9. LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA’S NEWEST EXPORT
101 (2001) (“[T]he fact that stockholders vote and have the power to oust the board of
directors and corporate management is a very powerful incentive for directors and managers
to focus their attention on stockholder happiness.”).
10. See, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, Making the Corporation Safe for Shareholder Democracy,
69 OHIO ST. L.J. 53, 55 (2008) (describing Bebchuk as “one of the most outspoken proponents
of shareholder democracy”).
11. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful
Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence & Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887
(2002).
12. LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE (2005).
13. Lucian Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. 973 (2002).
14. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 682-94
(2007); Bebchuk, supra note 3; Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the
Ballot, 59 BUS. LAW. 43 (2003).
15. Rose, supra note 4, at 889-91.
16. Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Proposes To Widen Investors’ Say on Boards, N.Y. TIMES,
May 21, 2009, at B3.
17. See, e.g., Latham & Watkins, Binding By-Law Shareholder Proposals: The Next
Frontier for Corporate Activists, M&A DEAL COMMENT., Aug. 1, 2006, http://www.lw.com/
upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub/620_1.pdf (“[A]ctivist investors are shifting their focus to
shareholder proposals for by-law amendments to implement corporate governance reform in
place of traditional nonbinding shareholder proposals that merely recommend board action.”).
strengthening the franchise is the most meaningful way to fulfill the
norm of shareholder primacy.9
Thus, much of corporate law scholarship of the past decade has
focused on shareholder democracy. The most well-known share-
holder democracy advocate in academia is Lucian Bebchuk.10 In
earlier work, Bebchuk advocated for pro-shareholder reforms such
as eliminating staggered boards,11 monitoring managerial pay more
carefully,12 and preventing boards from vetoing takeover bids that
have been approved by shareholders.13 Bebchuk’s recent work has
focused on fostering shareholder democracy as a way of effectuating
shareholder primacy.14 Other commentators in academia and the
business press have also advocated for pro-democracy reforms.
Institutional shareholders are taking their voting rights more
seriously, and the proxy advisory sector continues to grow in size
and importance.15 The SEC has yet again proposed changes to the
proxy that would allow for greater shareholder access,16 and
shareholders have also tried to take matters into their own hands
with shareholder proposals and bylaw amendments that would
facilitate their voting power.17
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18. A well-known advocate of board primacy is Martin Lipton, the inventor of the poison
pill. See, e.g., Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, Elections in the Company’s Proxy: An
Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 BUS. LAW. 67 (2003); Martin Lipton & William Savitt, The
Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REV. 733 (2007). Academic advocates for board
primacy include Lawrence Mitchell, Stephen Bainbridge, Lynn Stout, and Margaret Blair. See
MITCHELL, supra note 9, at 111-32 (discussing board-centered reforms); Bainbridge, Director
Primacy, supra note 2, at 550; Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory
of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 309-15 (1999); Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of
Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789, 802-06 (2007).
19. See supra note 18.
20. See supra note 18.
21. See supra note 18.
22. See supra note 18.
23. For earlier works in our ongoing examination of the exclusive shareholder franchise,
see Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, One Share, One Vote and the False Promise of
Shareholder Homogeneity, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 445 (2008) [hereinafter Hayden & Bodie, One
Share, One Vote], and Grant Hayden & Matthew Bodie, Arrow’s Theorem and the Exclusive
Shareholder Franchise, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1217 (2009) [hereinafter Hayden & Bodie, Arrow’s
Theorem].
It may seem hard, as a rhetorical matter, to be against share-
holder democracy. However, there are a set of commentators and
theorists who remain committed to the old ways.18 Instead of
advocating for greater shareholder involvement, they advocate for
greater board independence.19 Rather than exposing the board to the
will of the electorate, they believe the board should be insulated
from such exposure.20 Instead of shareholder primacy, they argue for
some variant of board primacy—namely, that the board, not the
shareholders, should be the focus of the corporation.
Theories of board primacy have developed relatively recently,
perhaps in part because shareholder democracy has languished so
long. These theories and their policy prescriptions represent an
important body of thought about the nature and purpose of corpo-
rate structure. Rather than following the fairly intuitive notion that
voters should have more power to choose their representatives,
board primacists argue for a more insulated board.21 They do so for
a variety of reasons—some common, some variegated. But they all
believe that facilitating shareholder democracy, and thereby
shareholder power, would create costs that would outweigh the
purported benefits.22
At this stage of our inquiry into the shareholder franchise, it is
important to consider the counter-revolutionary turn toward board
primacy.23 This Article seeks to disentangle the various justifica-
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tions for board primacy and thereby illustrate the underlying value
judgments and practical assumptions made by board primacists. As
a result, we argue that board primacists may in fact be a rather
unstable coalition—one that might be best served by a reexamina-
tion of their underlying interests.
In Part I of this Article, we situate the corporate governance
debate within the larger context of democratic theory, focusing on
the basic distinction between public choice and civic republican
approaches to social decision making. Part II of the Article is
devoted to an examination of the standard law-and-economics
underpinnings of shareholder primacy and the destabilization of
those underpinnings by recent research showing that shareholders
are not the homogeneous group of wealth maximizers they were
once thought to be. The Article then turns to the approaches of
board primacy theorists. These theorists, despite having a wide
range of normative goals, all argue for governance structures that
put greater distance between the shareholder electorate and the
board.
The crux of the Article is in Part III, where we critically evaluate
the resulting position of board primacy theorists in the context of
democratic decision making. Initially, the arguments for many of
their positions rely upon a conflation of two very different aspects
of group decision-making processes: the responsiveness of the
governance system and the composition of the electorate. This
confusion ends up putting the board primacy theorists in the curious
position of moving away from the public choice emphasis on pre-
ference aggregation toward a more civic republican model of less
responsive, more deliberative decision making. But by restricting
the franchise to shareholders, they have needlessly detached their
governance structures from the underlying preferences of their
constituents without substituting anything in their place. In other
words, these theorists have become civic republicans without any
meaningful sense of the public (or, in this case, corporate) good.
I. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN A POLITICAL CONTEXT
Corporate governance scholarship has largely concerned itself
with structuring corporations in a way that maximizes the utility of
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24. Most corporate law theorists have focused on the maximization of a particular set of
constituents—namely, shareholders. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 72-74 (1991) (discussing how the corporate
voting structure maximizes utility). However, the concept of shareholder primacy is based on
the theory that maximizing shareholder welfare also maximizes the overall welfare of all
corporate constituents. See id. at 73. For an in-depth discussion on the nature and purpose
of the corporation, see Symposium, The Klein Criteria Project, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1 (2005)
(including articles by Paul S. Edwards, Mitu Gulati, William Klein, J. Mark Ramseyer,
Edmund W. Kitch, Tomotaka Fujita, William W. Bratton, Stephen M. Bainbridge, Robert B.
Thompson, David A. Skeel, Jr., Stewart Macaulay, Randall S. Thomas, Ronald J. Gilson,
Lawrence E. Mitchell, and Melvin Aron Eisenberg).
25. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955-56 (Del. 1985)
(defining the various constituencies that boards can consider when plotting defensive moves
to a hostile takeover); Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow Hopes
and False Fears, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85, 97 (discussing the definition of “constituency” in
corporate constituency statutes).
26. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955; Springer, supra note 25, at 96 (discussing Minnesota’s
corporate constituency statute, which considers “the economy of the state and nation” and
“community and societal considerations”).
27. This assumes a utilitarian orientation. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth
Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2065 (2001).
28. See Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 2, at 550 (discussing how boards of
directors control corporations). For an example of the statutory provisions giving directors
control, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2009).
29. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141.
30. See id.
corporate constituents.24 Corporate constituents are variously
defined, but typically include shareholders, employees, suppliers,
customers, and creditors.25 Sometimes this list is expanded to
include others who don’t necessarily contract with corporations but
are nonetheless affected by corporate decisions, such as neighbors,
towns, or, even more generally, society.26 A corporation should be
organized in the way that allows it to best increase social welfare,
however defined.27
The mechanisms of corporate decision making are many,
extending from the top to the bottom of a corporate hierarchy. As
creatures of state law, corporations must follow the specific re-
quirements set forth by each state for corporate formation. The
corporation must have a person or set of persons who serve as the
situs of responsibility and authority on behalf of the fictional
corporate person.28 In almost all corporations, this locus of power is
the board of directors.29 The board has the authority to bind the cor-
poration, make contracts on its behalf, and dispose of its property.30
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31. See Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 2, at 559.
32. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 3.3 (1986).
33. See Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 2, at 559.
34. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1991).
35. See Blair & Stout, supra note 18, at 256-57, 323-24; Ian B. Lee, Citizenship and the
Corporation, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 129 (2009) (discussing how economic theory has
dominated corporate law and arguing that political theory should play a larger role).
36. See Bernard Grofman, Public Choice, Civic Republicanism, and American Politics:
Perspectives of a “Reasonable Choice” Modeler, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1541, 1547-51 (1993). This is
not the only way to describe this basic distinction. As we will see later in the Article, it may
also be at the heart of the difference between direct and representative democracy, and
Kenneth Arrow’s distinction between consensus and authority decision-making structures.
However, boards generally delegate swaths of their authority to
the officers of the corporation.31 These officers then fill out the rest
of the structure of the corporation through additional hiring. The
chief executive officer is usually regarded as the head of the
corporation, and large corporations have complex structures in
which officers oversee divisions, departments, and even separate
corporate entities as part of the overall enterprise.32 Most boards of
directors, in contrast, delegate most decision making and meet only
a few times each year.33 Corporate law scholarship, though,
concentrates attention on the relationship between what it sees as
the principal actors: the board, the officers, and the shareholders.
Given the importance of governance to corporate law, it is natural
to turn to political theory in analyzing the structures and relation-
ships. Public choice theory, with its emphasis on the interests of
different groups and its analysis of the effect of different structures
on outcomes, is a natural methodology for studying corporate
governance.34 More generally, political theory concerns the alloca-
tion and transfer of power in decision making and the roles of
different institutions in the governance of a polity. Economics has
dominated corporate law to the almost complete exclusion of
political theory, perhaps because corporate law theorists are
sometimes quite suspicious of political analogies (despite borrowing
what they think is useful).35 At the fundamental level of the
structure of the corporation, however, the lessons of politics may be
instructive.
In political theory, there are two basic ways of conceptualizing
democratic decision processes: a public choice approach and a civic
republican approach.36 The public choice version views group
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See infra notes 140-47, 169-79 and accompanying text.
37. Grofman, supra note 36, at 1549 (citing Cass A. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican
Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1554-55 (1988)).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See id. For a brief historical survey of republicanism, see Brett H. McDonnell,
Employee Primacy, or Economics Meets Civic Republicanism at Work, 13 STAN. J.L. BUS. &
FIN. 334, 344-47 (2008).
41. Grofman, supra note 36, at 1549-50.
42. See id.
43. Id. at 1549.
44. See id.
decision processes mainly as an exercise in preference aggregation.37
Individual preferences are taken as given, and individual and social
welfare is measured in terms of preference satisfaction.38 The best
group decision processes, then, are those that best aggregate indi-
vidual preferences into social choices.39
A civic republican approach, by contrast, posits a substantive
concept of the public good that goes beyond mere preference aggre-
gation.40 This notion of the public good is capable of being perceived
and refined through deliberation and, in fact, may counsel a decision
that does not maximize the satisfaction of existing preferences.41
The public good is not unrelated to preference satisfaction but it is
not beholden to it.42
While these two aspects of group decision processes are rarely
seen in their pure forms, they provide a useful way of illustrating
some of the features of actual decision processes and, more to the
point, examining the scholarship in support of them. When focusing
on the aggregative function of decision making, for example, it
makes little sense to describe outcomes as good or bad, though one
may decide that some flaw in the process led to an outcome that was
“not really what most people wanted.”43 From the point of view of a
civic republican, on the other hand, decisions are good or bad de-
pending upon whether they advance or retard the public good.44
Most democratic decision procedures are designed to take advantage
of the benefits of both approaches and thus are composed of a mix
of public choice and civic republican features.
These two views may also help sharpen our assessment of some
of the scholarly claims about governance structures. For example,
scholarship that tends to emphasize aggregation sometimes over-
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45. See id. at 1551.
46. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283,
325 (1998).
47. Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 59 ALA. L. REV.
1385, 1427-32 (2008).
48. Lewis A. Kornhauser, Constrained Optimization: Corporate Law and the Maximization
of Social Welfare, in THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL
LAW 87, 98-100 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds., 2000).
49. Bruner, supra note 47, at 1427; Lawrence E. Mitchell, Vulnerability and Efficiency (of
What?), 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 153, 153-54 (2005).
50. Bruner, supra note 47, at 1427; Mitchell, supra note 49, at 153-54.
51. Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A
Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1423-25 (1993) [hereinafter
Bainbridge, In Defense].
looks the value of deliberation in decision making, and scholarship
that focuses on deliberation and the public good may overlook the
useful corrective force and empirical grounding of actual preferences
in the decision process.45 Using this simple dichotomy—between
aggregative and deliberative processes, preferences and judgments
—may help us assess and compare features of group decision-
making structures and the scholarly arguments in support of them.
II. THE THEORIES OF BOARD PRIMACY
A. The Traditional Story of Shareholder Primacy
1. Shareholder Primacy
Public choice theory meshes well with the existing corporate law
literature, as most of the literature is based on a utilitarian
approach.46 Under this approach, the goal of corporate law—as with
all law—is to maximize social utility.47 Using Kaldor-Hicks effi-
ciency theory, social utility is maximized by the aggregation of all
individual utility.48 Thus, corporate law theory generally seeks to
foster a system of corporate governance that maximizes overall
individual utility.49 The structure of control rights and property
rights is designed to generate the most corporate wealth at the
lowest cost to society.50 Shareholder primacy is the core concept of
U.S. corporate law.51 Although there are various approaches to the
concept, shareholder primacy generally means that corporations
2082 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:2071
52. See D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 277 (1998)
(“The structure of corporate law ensures that corporations generally operate in the interests
of shareholders.”).
53. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (2009).
54. See, e.g., id. § 251.
55. See, e.g., id. § 242.
56. See, e.g., id. § 109. But see OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1013 (2009).
57. Proxy Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2009).
58. See Hayden & Bodie, One Share, One Vote, supra note 23, at 472-74.
59. Smith, supra note 52, at 278 & n.1.
60. Bainbridge, In Defense, supra note 51, at 1425.
61. See Smith, supra note 52, at 299 (describing the development of the principle of
exist to serve the interests of shareholders.52 The basic structural
component of shareholder primacy is the right of shareholders to
elect the board of directors.53 Because the board is the locus of final
authority within the corporation, the right to choose the board gives
shareholders ultimate authority. In addition, shareholders are
granted rights to vote on essential corporate decisions, such as
mergers and the sale of substantially all of the corporation’s
assets.54 Shareholders are generally given the right to amend the
corporation’s charter,55 and in some jurisdictions may retain the
power to amend corporate bylaws.56 In addition, federal regulations
permit shareholders to propose resolutions regarding governance
issues that are placed on the corporation’s proxy ballot and voted
upon at the annual meeting.57
However, the concept of shareholder primacy extends well beyond
these structural mechanisms. Shareholder primacy is a theory—a
belief system, if you will—that maximizing shareholder wealth is in
the best interests of society.58 Scholars have referred to the notion
that corporations should seek primarily, if not solely, to maximize
returns to their shareholders as the shareholder primacy norm59 or
the shareholder wealth maximization norm.60 This norm is much
more than a descriptive account of shareholders’ rights; it is instead
a normative judgment on the most socially efficient way of organ-
izing the economy. Proponents of this norm argue that we will
maximize our utility as a society only through a system of corporate
law that recognizes and perpetuates shareholder primacy.
One of the basic tenets of shareholder primacy is that, with few
exceptions, shareholders alone possess the right to vote in corporate
board elections.61 There have been many arguments advanced in
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shareholder primacy as deriving in part from the fact of “the exclusive right of shareholders
to vote”).
62. For a version of this argument, see, for example, Milton Friedman, The Social
Responsibility of Business Is To Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970 (Magazine),
at 32-33, 122-26 (arguing that shareholders are “the owners of the business” and that
therefore the only “social responsibility of business is to increase its profits”).
63. See Stout, supra note 18, at 804-05.
64. See Lipton & Savitt, supra note 18, at 754.
65. Hayden & Bodie, One Share, One Vote, supra note 23, at 473.
66. Id.
67. For a version of this argument, see, for example, EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note
24, at 67-70, 91. 
68. See id. at 67-68.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 68.
support of this particular arrangement. One argument is that
shareholders are the owners of the corporation and thus, ultimately,
should be able to control corporate decisions.62 But it is unclear why,
among the many groups of corporate constituents, shareholders are
deemed to be the owners.63 They do not, for example, possess many
of the traditional rights that come with property ownership—
including the right to exclude, or the right of possession.64 Moreover,
this entire line of reasoning is circular. Shareholders purchase a set
of rights from a corporation. That set of rights typically includes the
right to vote for directors, but the stock ownership “bundle” could
easily be constructed without that right.65 In the end, “[l]abeling
shareholders ‘owners’ is no more of a justification for the vote than
is labeling them ‘voters.’”66
A second argument in favor of the exclusive shareholder franchise
is that shareholders are the sole residual claimants and, as such,
are in the best position to exercise control for the good of all cor-
porate constituents.67 This argument assumes that the interests of
all other corporate participants—employees, suppliers, customers,
and creditors—are captured by rigidly set contractual entitle-
ments.68 Shareholders benefit from maximization of the residual
because they are not paid until all other claimants receive their
entitlements.69 This gives shareholders, and shareholders alone, the
appropriate incentives to exercise discretion in a way that maxi-
mizes value for the entire corporation.70
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71. For an extended critique of the argument based on shareholders as sole residual
claimants, see MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 227-34 (1995).
72. See id. at 275-76.
73. See id. at 255-57.
74. There are additional shortcomings to the argument from the residual. For one, the
“residual” is not simply the money left over, because that is a function of all of the other
agreements that have come before it. Employees may have a claim to the residual if they have
some profit sharing or stock options—and these programs generally do not give any control
rights. This argument can be expanded further into the nature of the shareholders’ claim to
the residual, etc. Second, shareholders have the right to profits based on their right to control,
as well as their position as the residual claimants. Their share prices reflect the possibility
that someone will buy them out in order to take control of the company. This is not really part
of the residual—it is the monetary value of control itself. Third, even if the residual has some
meaning (that is, the right to firm profits), it is not a static concept—some shareholders will
want to increase the short-term residual, while others will want to plow more money into
research and design for long-term profits. There is no one “residual payment” that everyone
can agree on maximizing.
The residual argument, while more substantive than the “share-
holders are owners” argument, is not without shortcomings.71 First,
there is no doubt that constituents other than shareholders have
interests in the corporate residual that are uncaptured by their
contracts.72 Employees with firm-specific skills, for example, have
an interest in the residual because, by definition, there is no market
that would allow them to capture the full value of their skills by
contract.73 Second, the argument also has a circularity to it. While
it may make sense to give the right to vote to those with a residual
interest, this just changes the question to “who should have con-
tractual rights to the corporate residual?” Without some additional
argument that, for some additional reason, shareholders should
have a right to the corporate residual, we really haven’t progressed
very far. The “argument” becomes a mere description of the current
state of affairs, not an independent reason to assign the residual
(and voting rights that come with it) to shareholders alone.74
In order to get away from these potential circularities, many
scholars have made further arguments as to why only one class of
constituents should have the right to vote and why shareholders are
best suited for the task. The residual argument, for example, ceases
to be circular when one gives a reason that shareholders alone
should be contractually entitled to the residual (and thus, the vote).
So what are these additional arguments?
2010] SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY 2085
75. See Hayden & Bodie, Arrow’s Theorem, supra note 23, at 1225-27.
76. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 45-50 (2008) [hereinafter BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE]; Blair & Stout,
supra note 18, at 313; Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Basic Governance
2. Shareholder Homogeneity and the Right To Vote
Many of the arguments for the exclusive shareholder franchise
have, at their core, an assumption of (at least relative) shareholder
preference homogeneity. Shareholders, it is argued, have a single-
minded interest in profit maximization. This makes them the most
homogeneous group of corporate constituents, and certainly more
homogeneous than a combined electorate including, for example,
shareholders and employees. This homogeneity is thought to bring
many advantages when it comes to designing the structures of
corporate governance.
Those who champion a more homogenous electorate typically pose
their arguments in the negative: a more heterogeneous electorate
causes all sorts of problems. For example, a more diverse electorate
is believed to introduce various procedural inefficiencies to the
corporate governance process. Members of such an electorate would
be prone to the kind of squabbling that would bog down decision
making, or, worse yet, would have the kind of preferences that give
rise to the voting pathologies described by Arrow’s theorem. A more
diverse electorate is also said to produce substantive inefficiencies.
The argument here is that voters with special interests would be in
a position to exploit other voters or other corporate constituents
rather than pursue a common goal of maximizing corporate wealth.
Corporate scholars from across the spectrum who argue in favor of
the exclusive shareholder franchise rely on one or both of these sets
of inefficiencies to advance their vision of corporate governance.
Scholars typically point to three basic types of procedural ineffi-
ciencies that come with a more diverse board electorate: political
breakdowns, voting pathologies, and difficulties in apportioning
voting power. The political breakdowns (which we have elsewhere
called the argument from politics)75 come in the form of disagree-
ments, internal bickering, information asymmetries, and other
internal conflicts that make for less efficient corporate decision
making.76 (This is argued to be true whether the asserted diversity
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77. Hansmann & Kraakman, Governance Structure, supra note 76, at 64. Among the costs
is the problem of a tyrannical majority exploiting a minority interest. See infra notes 87-88
and accompanying text.
78. This argument was first made by Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting
in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 405 (1983) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting
in Corporate Law], and later recounted in their book, EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note
24, at 70. It has since been repeated by a variety of scholars. See, e.g., HENRY HANSMANN, THE
OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 44 (1996); Blair & Stout, supra note 18, at 313.
79. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, supra note 78, at 405.
80. Id.
81. See id.
is among an electorate that includes different groups of constitu-
ents, a group of constituents other than shareholders, or in some
cases, shareholders themselves.) Many corporate theorists have
advanced versions of the political breakdown argument. It usually
takes the form of a parade of horribles that would accompany the
resulting decision-making process. Henry Hansmann and Reinier
Kraakman, for example, point out that adding employee representa-
tives would lead to “highly cumbersome and costly” decision pro-
cesses.77 In any case, the political breakdown argument is that more
diverse constituents, and the corporate board it elects, will come to
agreement on corporate decisions less readily than a board repre-
senting more homogeneous constituents.
The second type of procedural inefficiency said to accompany a
more diverse electorate is the threat of voting pathologies, or cycles.
One of the central arguments for the exclusive shareholder fran-
chise, for example, relies upon Arrow’s theorem.78 The reasoning
here is that if voters hold dissimilar preferences, the theorem tells
us that it will not be possible to design a voting system that pro-
duces a transitive (that is, acyclical) outcome.79 If corporate voting
produces cyclical results, the resulting inconsistencies could, in the
view of Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, cause a firm to “self-
destruct.”80 Thus, voting should be limited to those with similar, or
at least “single peaked,” preferences.81 Shareholders, according to
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those who make this argument, best fit the bill because of their
homogeneous interest in wealth maximization.82
The third procedural inefficiency offered for restricting voting to
shareholders is that we have a nuanced proxy for their degree of
interest in the corporation: the number of shares they own.83
Shareholders have a common interest in maximizing the value of
shares. Each share represents an equal bit of financial interest in
the firm, and thus, the thinking goes, each shareholder’s stake in
the outcome of a board election is proportionate to the number of
shares she possesses.84 The one share, one vote rule, then, allows us
to perfectly tailor one’s stake in the outcome of the election to one’s
voting power.85 With respect to other stakeholders—employees,
creditors, customers, and the like—we do not have an obvious way
to fine tune the levels of interest within each group, much less
against shareholders.86 Shareholders, then, with their well-cali-
brated voting scheme, are the constituency best suited to vote.
In addition to these more procedural inefficiencies, there are said
to be substantive inefficiencies that would accompany an expanded
electorate. The most straightforward of these is that a more diverse
set of voters just means more opportunities for groups to exploit
each other.87 This is viewed as especially problematic when a
tyrannical majority imposes its will on other constituents, but may
also occur when a minority, for some reason or another, comes to
dominate the process.88 Either way, expanding the electorate to
include other constituents would allow factions to advance their own
special interests over the good of the corporate whole. For that
reason, voting should be limited to a single group of constituents,
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and the most homogenous group at that.89 Shareholders, once again,
fit the bill.
In sum, many of the arguments used to support shareholder
primacy theory, and the exclusive shareholder vote in particular,
are based on shareholder homogeneity. The like-minded views of
shareholders make it easier to reach consensus and avoid the risk
of damaging voting cycles. They also alleviate the concern that one
group of voters will hijack the decision process to favor their own
special interests over those of the firm. Shareholder homogeneity,
then, provides some of the most important undergirding to share-
holder primacy theory; without it, we would need to significantly
revise our view of corporate governance.
B. The Counter-Narratives of Board Primacy
Throughout the reign of shareholder primacy as the dominant
theoretical narrative of corporate law, there have been dissenting
voices. At various points, some of these voices have coalesced into
groups of like-minded theorists.90 As it stands now, however, there
is no one school of thought standing in opposition. Instead, a col-
lection of academic commentators have individually rallied around
various versions of what we call “board primacy.” All of these com-
mentators agree that the board of directors should be accorded more
power and deference within the corporate structure. They stand
opposed to greater shareholder democracy and they believe that the
corporation is best served by a board that can make decisions
largely free of shareholder influence. These commentators come
from a variety of backgrounds—law professor, economist, and cor-
porate attorney—as well as a variety of political viewpoints, ranging
from conservative to progressive. They disagree on the appropriate
purpose and goals of the corporation and of corporate law. However,
they all stand in support of a version of “board primacy” in which
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the board can operate in a more independent manner than share-
holder primacists currently advocate.
Below are brief descriptions of four prominent board primacy
theories: Stephen Bainbridge’s director primacy theory, Margaret
Blair and Lynn Stout’s team production theory, Lawrence Mitchell’s
self-perpetuating board, and Martin Lipton and Steven Rosenblum’s
quinquennial election model. Based on similarities in their ap-
proaches, we categorize Bainbridge as well as Blair and Stout as
“wise ruler” theorists, while we characterize Mitchell as well as
Lipton and Rosenblum as “long-term interests” theorists.91
1. The “Wise Ruler” Theorists
Shareholder democracy advocates generally bemoan director
independence. They view the disconnect between shareholders and
directors as the primary source of intrafirm agency costs—namely,
the costs shareholders must bear for delegating control of the cor-
poration to someone else. If shareholders can find ways to exert
more power over the board, they posit, the corporation will focus
more on shareholder interests and less on their own self-interest.
This change will cut down on agency costs and lead to greater firm
and societal efficiency. However, Bainbridge as well as Blair and
Stout disagree with this analysis. They have argued instead that the
board must be free to make its own decisions without undue
pressure from shareholders. Freed to operate more independently,
directors will make better choices about how the firm should
proceed.
We call these commentators the “wise ruler” theorists because
they invest the board with a great deal of acumen, as well as power.
Bainbridge has described the board as the “Platonic guardian” of the
firm.92 He argues that the board sits at the center of a nexus of
contracts between various constituents of the firm and the fictional
“firm” itself.93 Similarly, Blair and Stout describe the board as
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“mediating hierarchs” who manage the relationships of various
corporate constituencies.94 Under both scenarios, the board is envi-
sioned as a body that exists above all the other participants, with
authority apart from them. Indeed, independence and insulation are
critical to the performance of their roles.
Bainbridge’s “director primacy” theory has a significant descrip-
tive component in that he believes the theory offers the best account
of why boards are structured to have the independence that they are
generally afforded.95 However, Bainbridge also defends the status
quo, arguing that shareholder democracy reforms would be harmful
to corporate welfare.96 He largely relies on the work of Kenneth
Arrow with regard to the tension between authority and account-
ability.97 Although greater board accountability to shareholders
might reduce agency costs, Bainbridge argues that such reforms
would create much inefficiency within the corporation. As he de-
scribes:
Active investor involvement in corporate decisionmaking seems
likely to disrupt the very mechanism that makes the widely held
public corporation practicable: namely, the centralization of
essentially nonreviewable decisionmaking authority in the board
of directors. The chief economic virtue of the public corporation
is ... that it provides a hierarchical decisionmaking structure
well-suited to the problem of operating a large business enter-
prise with numerous employees, managers, shareholders, cred-
itors, and other constituencies.98
Bainbridge does not quarrel with shareholder primacy as the goal
of the corporation; in fact, he believes that the board should direct
itself toward shareholder wealth maximization.99 However, he
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believes that the proper means to achieve this end is through
director primacy.
Blair and Stout see a comparable role for the board within their
model of the corporation. Similar to Bainbridge and other con-
tractarian theorists, Blair and Stout see the firm as a series of
relationships between the various constituencies that make up the
business.100 These relationships result in the joint production of
goods or services that in turn create wealth. The directors serve as
the ultimate authority when it comes to assigning responsibilities,
mediating disputes, and divvying up the profits.101 Board insulation
and independence is therefore critical to their role. The board must
be independent from all constituencies in order to be trusted with
such a crucial and uncertain responsibility. If the board favored one
constituency over others, the unfavored groups would be less willing
to make the proper investments of capital and labor to make the
firm function.
Unlike Bainbridge, Blair and Stout do not argue that shareholder
wealth maximization should be the goal of the corporation.102
Instead, they argue that directors owe a duty to the corporation and
that the corporation consists of all of the stakeholders who are
responsible for the business of the enterprise.103 Blair and Stout
focus on shareholders and employees, but they also cite to creditors
and the local community as potential stakeholders as well.104
According to the model, these stakeholders contribute their re-
sources to the enterprise with the implicit bargain that the enter-
prise itself will fairly apportion the responsibilities and rewards.105
The board is hired by these stakeholders to serve as the apportion-
ing body. Thus, although the board is in some sense an agent for the
stakeholders, it must have authority above them in order to carry
2092 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:2071
106. Id. at 280-81.
107. Bainbridge, Shareholder Disempowerment, supra note 96; Stout, supra note 18, at 791-
92.
108. Lynn Stout has argued in later articles for greater constraints on shareholders. See,
e.g., Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 1255, 1256 (2008) (arguing that corporate law should impose a duty of loyalty on
shareholders). She has also echoed the concerns about shareholders’ short-term time horizons
that drive the proposals of Mitchell and Lipton, and Rosenblum, discussed infra.
109. See infra notes 110-25.
out its function. The role is thus less one of an agent and more that
of a trustee.106
Neither Bainbridge nor Blair and Stout offer extensive policy
reforms. Instead, both theories are best characterized as descrip-
tions of the status quo that explain, as well as justify, the current
regime. Bainbridge and Stout have both extensively criticized efforts
to expand upon shareholder democracy.107 However, they have not
argued (unlike the commentators below) for efforts to further
insulate or protect directors’ discretion. Instead, they largely believe
the status quo (circa the turn of the century) offers the proper
balance.108
2. The “Long-Term Interests” Theorists
Another set of theorists also argues for board primacy: namely,
board insulation and independence from shareholder pressure.109
However, they base their analyses not on a model of corporate
structure, but rather on concerns about the influence of short-term
interests. In their view, shareholders have developed an extremely
short time horizon by which they judge the success of the corpora-
tion and its leadership. As boards and officers have come under
more pressure to follow the desires of shareholders, they have
adopted the goal of short-term share price maximization. This focus,
they argue, has skewed the perspectives of shareholders and, as a
result, has hurt the long-term efficiency of corporations.
Although a number of commentators share this concern about
short-termism, we look at two sets of commentators who have long
focused on it. Since the early 1990s, Lawrence Mitchell and Martin
Lipton have criticized shareholder primacy on the grounds that it
inexorably leads to short-term share price primacy. And both have
proposed somewhat dramatic solutions to this problem.
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In an article and a subsequent book, Mitchell has argued that
boards at large public companies should be self-perpetuating.110 As
Mitchell describes his proposal: “[O]nce the members of the board
[are] put in place, either by a one-time stockholder vote or public
appointment or something like it, the board itself [is] to fill the
periodic vacancies resulting from death, resignation, and increases
in board size by selecting the people to fill those vacancies.”111
Mitchell acknowledges that this is a “pretty radical idea,”112 but
he believes such a radical approach would best free managers to
manage the firm. Because any control by shareholders would focus
directors on share price, Mitchell believes that complete freedom
from shareholder oversight would “enable them to manage responsi-
bly and for the long term.”113
Because his proposal is such a dramatic departure from current
law, Mitchell also endorses the quinquennial election proposal of
Lipton and Rosenblum.114 In the article outlining their approach,
Lipton and Rosenblum also deplore the short-term focus that
shareholder primacy brings to the corporation.115 In a complex set
of reforms, they establish a new framework for corporate gover-
nance, the centerpiece of which is lengthening directors’ terms to
five years. During these five years, directors could not be ousted
save for illegal conduct or “willful malfeasance.”116 Directors would
also be entitled to approve all mergers, acquisitions, buyouts, or
takeovers, except that such changes could only be accomplished at
the time of the directors’ election.117 As part of the election, the
directors would be required to propose an in-depth five-year plan,
and their compensation would be tied to achieving the goals set
forth in the plan.118 The board would also be responsible for hiring
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their plan.119
Both the self-perpetuating board and the quinquennially elected
board are significantly more insulated from shareholders than
current law provides. Neither set of commentators seem too
concerned about the downgrade in shareholder power, as they
view that power as the problem in the first place. Under the
quinquennial election plan, Lipton and Rosenblum believe that
shareholders would in fact have a limited but revitalized role, as
they conceive of the election as a time for shareholders to make a
meaningful vote on the corporation’s future. As such, they provide
that shareholders holding at least 5 percent of the corporation’s
equity would have access to the proxy ballot.120 In the original
description of Mitchell’s self-perpetuating plan, the board would
only become self-perpetuating once the corporation went public.
Therefore, the board of the privately-held company—elected by the
private shareholders—would essentially become the board ad
infinitum. Mitchell recommends, however, that this board “replace
itself with a group of directors who are neither managers nor
stockholders[;]” instead, the board would be made up of independent
directors.121 Mitchell believes that this change would render the
board “far less likely to feel allegiance to management.”122 In his
later discussion of the policy, Mitchell is more oblique about the
composition, stating that “the members of the board [would be] put
in place, either by a one-time stockholder vote or public appoint-
ment or something like it.”123 And when he endorses Lipton and
Rosenblum’s proposal, he also tepidly endorses an expansion of the
electorate to include employees and creditors. Mitchell argues that
“there’s no reason to think, unless you view stock price maximiza-
tion as the corporation’s only legitimate goal, that allowing employ-
ees and creditors to vote too would damage the corporation.”124
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Indeed, Mitchell has gone even further in his most recent work,
arguing that “ideally (although most likely improbably), the right of
public shareholders to vote should be eliminated.”125
From these brief sketches, it is clear that all board primacists
believe the board should not become more responsive to shareholder
concerns. The “wise ruler” theorists largely believe the system is
balanced properly, while the “long-term” theorists would reorient
the board toward a longer-term outlook by extending the tenure of
board members. Only Mitchell suggests any changes to the elector-
ate, and he does so in a somewhat offhanded way. Instead, these
theorists largely believe that tinkering with the board itself, rather
than those who choose the board, would be the best course of
reform. We now turn to a deeper examination of the theories and,
in particular, the issue of the electorate.
      III. BOARD PRIMACY, BOARD RESPONSIVENESS, AND THE      
COMPOSITION OF THE ELECTORATE
Over the last several years, it has become increasingly clear that
shareholders are not, in fact, the homogeneous wealth maximizers
they were once thought to be. Shareholders, it turns out, have inter-
ests that diverge along a number of dimensions.126 Commentators
have recently focused attention upon the problems caused by equity
derivatives, which carve up various shareholder rights into discrete
financial securities.127 But there are many other ways in which
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shareholders fail to share common interests.128 And even when
shareholder interests line up and they agree on a definition of
wealth maximization, they may differ as to the best way to achieve
that goal.129 Ultimately, the notion that shareholders have homoge-
neous preferences is a simplifying assumption that is increasingly
under strain.130
One possible response to shareholder heterogeneity is to move
away from shareholder primacy toward a system of governance that
is less responsive, in the direction of board primacy. The preferences
of the shareholder electorate, it turns out, are as diverse (read:
scary) as those of other constituents. Thus, many of the reasons for
restricting the voting rights of those other constituents (the pro-
cedural and substantive inefficiencies) now apply to shareholders as
well. For those reasons, then, corporate boards should be less
responsive to shareholder interests and more power and discretion
should be accorded to these boards.
Shareholder diversity has pushed many scholars, touting both
board and shareholder primacy, in this direction. One sees this new
pressure throughout the corporate law literature when a question
arises as to the appropriate level of responsiveness of a system of
corporate governance. Hedge funds, for example, may have shorter
time horizons than other investors, and critics have cited this
potential for short-term focus as a reason for dampening their
influence.131 Others have argued that sovereign wealth funds—
investment funds run by nations, rather than capitalists—have
skewed incentives that differ from other shareholders. In fact, one
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set of commentators has even suggested that sovereign wealth
funds forego the right to vote in shareholder elections.132 Divergent
interests among shareholders may point in a variety of different
governance directions. That is, although shareholder heterogeneity
provides general support for board primacy, it is relevant to almost
any feature of corporate governance that makes the system more or
less responsive to the shareholders, and it generally exerts pressure
in the direction of making the system less responsive.
Thus, it is important to disentangle the two kinds of arguments
that are generally made in response to the diversity of preferences
exhibited by shareholders and other corporate constituents. One set
of arguments, which go to the level of responsiveness in the govern-
ance system, make some sense. The other set, however, goes beyond
responsiveness and continues to argue for a particular and exclusive
electorate—shareholders. These claims are often made together and
are sometimes conflated. But they are very different aspects to a
governance system—corporate or otherwise.
A. System Responsiveness to the Electorate
The worries about an overresponsive system of corporate gov-
ernance drive most board primacy theories.133 The corporation,
board primacy proponents argue, should be structured in a way that
the board is relatively insulated from the whims of the shareholder
electorate.134 The arguments here echo debates from political science
about the relative strengths and weaknesses of direct and repre-
sentative democracies.135 Direct democracies have a great deal of
responsiveness to the electorate’s preferences, and, as a result, may
be viewed as more legitimate. The downsides to such responsive-
ness, however, are that decision making on such a massive scale is
relatively costly and that direct democracies are more susceptible to
tyranny of the majority types of issues. Representative decision
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procedures, by contrast, are less responsive (and thus less suscep-
tible to a tyrannical majority) and more conducive to deliberation by
the elected representatives. The shortcoming of such a system,
though, is that as its representatives become less responsive to the
electorate, they may fail to make decisions that do, in fact, advance
the interests of their constituents.
It should come as no surprise that this distinction between direct
and representative decision structures maps, somewhat roughly,
onto our earlier discussion of the difference between public choice
and civic republican theories of democracy.136 Public choice theories,
with their emphasis on preference aggregation, tend to favor
more direct decision procedures such as initiatives that allow the
immediate aggregation of preferences into policy or, in some cases,
markets driven by individual choices.137 Civic republican theories
favor the detached deliberation afforded by more insulated groups
of representatives.138 The overlap isn’t perfect, and most theories of
governance fall somewhere in between the extremes, but it may help
sharpen some of the different approaches.
The fear of an overresponsive system of governance is the primary
force motivating a shift in power away from shareholders to the
board. As mentioned above, it resolves into two kinds of concerns.
First, a system that is too responsive to shareholders may give
rise to various procedural inefficiencies. Put simply, being more re-
sponsive costs time and money. A system of shareholder initiative,
for example, is viewed as problematic because it slows down
corporate decision making and because of the potential cost of
running the electoral machinery.139
The main proponent of board primacy, Stephen Bainbridge,
makes the point largely on the basis of Kenneth Arrow’s models
of consensus and authority decision making.140 According to
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Bainbridge, shareholders with differing interests and levels
of information would bog down corporate decision making.141
Bainbridge, citing Arrow, argues that decision making by consensus
works best when the participants have similar—if not identi-
cal—preferences and information. There are, initially, “mechanical
difficulties” in achieving consensus among thousands of sharehold-
ers.142 But even if such difficulties could be overcome, “active share-
holder participation in corporate decision making would still be
precluded by the shareholders’ widely divergent interests and
distinctly different levels of information.”143 Thus, Bainbridge
concludes, corporate governance systems are—and should be—
structured to enhance authority-based decision making, with the
board being the ultimate authority.144
Along these lines, a system responsive to shareholder preferences
may also be prone to voting pathologies, or cycles, which further
diminish the ability of firms to move decisively in some consistent
direction. The voting cycles argument was originally made in
defense of the exclusive shareholder franchise.145 Its premise,
though, was that there is a direct relationship between the diversity
of an electorate and the likelihood of damaging voting cycles. With
mounting evidence that shareholder preferences are actually quite
a bit more diverse than previously thought, such an argument
would also militate against expanded voting powers for sharehold-
ers as well. Indeed, Jeffrey Gordon, for one, argued for the absolute
delegation rule (and against shareholder initiatives) on precisely
those grounds years ago,146 and Bainbridge has made a similar
point.147 The possibility of voting cycles is problematic enough to
distance the board from its shareholder electorate and, as noted
earlier, keep other constituents out of that electorate altogether.
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The second and greater drawback to more responsive corporate
governance systems is that they give rise to tyranny of the majority.
They are, in other words, too efficient at translating the will of a
majority of the electorate into corporate action. This criticism comes
in various guises. For some, the worry is that certain “special
interest” shareholders will exploit other shareholders rather than
act for the good of all shareholders.148 Others worry that sharehold-
ers generally will exploit other corporate constituents.149 Either way,
a more responsive system of corporate governance will enable these
self-interested, sometimes transient majorities to manipulate
corporations toward their own selfish ends.
Several of the board primacy theorists cite to this fear of “tyranny
of the shareholder majority.” Blair and Stout establish their model
of “mediating hierarchs” on the notion that shareholder dominance
will lead the other team members to disinvest or invest less than
optimally. As they explain: “[T]eam members [including sharehold-
ers] understand they would be far less likely to elicit the full
cooperation and firm-specific investment of other members if they
did not give up control rights.”150 Thus, it is the directors’ job to
“balance team members’ competing interests in a fashion that keeps
everyone happy enough that the productive coalition stays to-
gether.”151 Accordingly, it only makes sense to Blair and Stout that
“American law in fact grants directors tremendous discretion to
sacrifice shareholders’ interests in favor of management, employees,
and creditors.”152 This need to “sacrifice” shareholder interests
explains the desire to insulate the board from shareholder impor-
tuning.
Similarly, the long-term theorists want to insulate the board
against shareholder pressure to maximize short-term gain. Lipton
and Rosenblum argue that institutional shareholders—the share-
holder group with the greatest voice and power—are biased toward
short-term results, and as a consequence such shareholders have
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pushed companies to favor quick results over long-term growth.153
Insulating the board with five-year terms allows the directors to
pursue a longer-term strategy without the risk of shareholder
wrath.154 In turn, this will “benefit the corporation’s other constitu-
encies, which prosper if the enterprise’s business operations prosper
over the long term.”155 Similarly, Mitchell argues that his self-
perpetuating board would best free directors “to do what it is they
do best, and that is manage (or provide for the management of)
corporations for the long term.”156 In order to accomplish this,
“[c]orporate management should be entirely separated from
stockholder pressure.”157
These arguments all point to a disconnection between the will of
the electoral majority and the good of the corporation. In order to
properly pursue the social good, the board has to be insulated from
the shareholders. Thus, these reformers all seek to dampen the
responsiveness of the corporate structure to shareholder concerns.
As a result, the board is (or would be) freed up to follow its own
discretion, even if it conflicts with a clear and uniform preference of
the electorate.
B. Board Primacy and Shareholder Homogeneity
It is clear that shareholders have less homogeneous preferences
than previously believed.158 This, in all likelihood, provides some
additional support for less responsive systems of corporate gover-
nance. It does not, however, counsel in favor of a corporate elector-
ate restricted to shareholders. Indeed, as discussed above,159 the
recent recognition that shareholders are more diverse than once
thought actually undercuts many of the arguments for their favored
position among corporate constituents. Board primacists, however,
have generally eschewed such analysis and simply kept the share-
holder electorate unchanged.160 But there is nothing in the typical
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arguments in favor of a less responsive system that entails this
result. The exclusive shareholder franchise just gets dragged along
for the ride into board primacy positions. And board primacists’
failure to reconsider the proper composition of the electorate leaves
them in an increasingly untenable position. Some, like Blair and
Stout, operate under the assumption that shareholder preferences
are quite homogeneous and argue accordingly when it comes to the
proper composition of the electorate.161 Others, like Bainbridge,
concede that shareholder preferences are less homogeneous than
once thought and instead argue that they are still more homoge-
neous than those of other constituents, or of a combined elec-
torate.162 Either way, the set of arguments from (relative) share-
holder homogeneity to their exclusive entitlement to the franchise
are similar.
Coming from advocates of board primacy, with its civic republican
emphasis on detached deliberation, these arguments for the exclu-
sive shareholder franchise are surprising. Take the first argu-
ment—the argument from politics—that expanding the board
electorate to include other constituents will lead to the kind of
bickering that will frustrate corporate decision making. Blair and
Stout, for example, ask us to “[i]magine the chaos and politicking
likely to attend an election in which a firm’s creditors, executives,
rank-and-file employees, and other stakeholders with unique and
often conflicting interests could vote on their favored candidates.”163
The electorate’s diverse interests, it is argued, would bog down the
decision-making process,164 either at the point of the election or in
the boardroom. Of course a more diverse electorate would, at some
level, make decision making less elegant. But this is not a compel-
ling argument for restricting the franchise to shareholders alone,
especially coming from advocates of board primacy. Initially, any
group choice procedure is intended to work with diverse preferences.
The entire point of most voting systems or other social choice
procedures is to take a set of individual preference profiles and
aggregate them into a group choice (indeed, if preferences were
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completely homogeneous, we could just poll one member of the
electorate and skip the rest of the process). A diverse board
electorate could vote in a single election (as shareholders now do) or
in separate elections for stakeholder representatives (like the
German codetermination model).165
The worry should be no greater at the board level—one can
always force a decision. Corporate boards, for example, traditionally
follow internal procedures requiring majority votes, with the chair
having tie-breaking authority.166 If the particular decision proce-
dures don’t seem to be working smoothly, one can usually identify
the problem and reduce or eliminate the difficulty by tinkering with
institutional design features. In the end, one can always design a
procedure for forcing a vote and thus reach a decision on any
particular issue—there may be winners and losers, but a decision
will be made that is based on voter preferences.
More to the point, though, advocates of board primacy appear to
be overvaluing consensus in the boardroom. One of the primary
benefits of more deliberative governance processes is that represen-
tatives, in addition to expressing their own views about the interests
of their constituents, may also persuade others to change their
minds. And they may be persuaded to change their own minds.
Indeed, a wide range of studies demonstrate that a greater diversity
of views mediated through the deliberative process may well lead to
better decision making.167
A governance system in which a diverse body of voters elects a
relatively insulated group of representatives should be especially
appealing to civic republicans with no fixed sense of the good.
Through the deliberative process and, if it comes to it, a vote, board
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members can come to a shared notion of the common good. Consen-
sus among the voters or the board members, in other words, is
overrated, especially when that consensus is bought at the price of
excluding those with differing views from the process.168 And claims
of efficiency all depend upon what is being maximized, which is
sometimes at the heart of the disagreement.
Bainbridge couches this political breakdown argument in terms
of Kenneth Arrow’s scheme of consensus and authority decision
making.169 The arguments made with respect to shareholder diver-
sity apply with even more force to other constituents because,
according to Bainbridge, an electorate expanded to include other
constituents, like employees, would be even more diverse.170 Thus,
corporations are no place for consensus-based decision making, and
the vote should accordingly be limited to shareholders alone.
Bainbridge’s version of this argument does not work that well as
a general matter or as applied to this issue of the proper scope of
the corporate electorate. Initially, his position—that constituents
with differing interests and levels of information counsel, according
to Arrow, an authority-based structure—is incomplete. Arrow does
postulate a tension between authoritarian- and consensus-based
governance.171 But, as Brett McDonnell recently pointed out,
“Bainbridge moves very, very quickly from recognizing the tension
between authority and accountability to arguing that we should
presume a legal structure that favors authority over accountabil-
ity.”172 These moves, which McDonnell dubs “Arrowian moments,”
occur throughout Bainbridge’s work, and are noteworthy for their
complete lack of substantive argument that the more authoritiarian,
board-centric solution is the correct one.173 In other words, recogniz-
ing the tension does not tell us where on the continuum we should
be with respect to each institutional design feature and certainly
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doesn’t tell us that we should always tilt toward the more authori-
tarian solution.
As applied to other constituencies and their voting power,
Bainbridge’s argument is even more tenuous. First, it conflates
the responsiveness of the governance system with those to whom it
is responsive. Arrow’s conceptual scheme argues for more author-
itarian (that is, less responsive) systems in certain situations, not
a restriction on the scope of the (however distant) electorate.
Second, once Bainbridge concedes shareholder diversity, his point
on the exclusive shareholder franchise hangs on the difference in
preference homogeneity between a shareholder electorate and either
an electorate composed of another constituency or an electorate
expanded to include shareholders and other constituents. There is
little argument that a material difference even exists.174 And, as
with the general version of his argument, there is nothing here to
suggest that the difference justifies this move to the extreme end of
the authority-consensus spectrum. In this situation, unlike when he
makes his general arguments from shareholder diversity to board
primacy, Bainbridge needs, if anything, a stronger argument, for
here he is deploying Arrow’s concepts toward cutting other constitu-
ents completely out of the governance process, not merely making
the process less responsive to them.
Another argument made for the exclusive shareholder franchise
trades on the looming specter of voting cycles.175 Its basic premise,
as noted before, is that there is a direct relationship between the
diversity of an electorate and the likelihood of damaging voting
cycles. In order to reduce the chance of a voting cycle, the electorate
should be limited to one corporate constituency, and the most
homogeneous one at that. Shareholders, with their common desire
to maximize share price, are just such a constituency.
But now that we know shareholder preferences are more diverse
than previously thought,176 what is left of the voting cycles argu-
ment for an exclusive shareholder franchise? Once again, the first
part of an answer to that question involves an assessment of how
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solid the argument was to begin with. As we argued in a previous
paper, the argument from Arrow’s theorem was misconceived from
the start.177 First, it assumed shareholder preference homogeneity
with respect to the ends of the firm, not the means, and not the best
slate of directors to effectuate those means. That is, even taking
shareholder homogeneity with respect to profit maximization at face
value, the argument did not involve agreement on the right level—
on board candidates—to avoid a cyclical result.178 Second, the argu-
ment never made clear how a nascent intransitivity in a board
election, even if it were to arise, would translate into inconsistent
firm choices. For a variety of reasons, most of which have to do with
the way corporate boards and their elections are structured, there
is almost no chance that such a cycle would manifest itself in the
form of a damaging corporate decision, much less one that would
cause a firm to self-destruct.179 The argument from Arrow’s theorem,
then, wasn’t very persuasive to begin with.
Even assuming that there was something to the argument, what
is left of it in the face of the recent assaults on the concept of share-
holder homogeneity? The answer is “not much,” but that hasn’t kept
board primacy theorists from continuing to rely upon it. Bainbridge,
for example, appears to think that preference homogeneity is a
one-dimensional concept and that more is better when it comes to
reducing the incidence of cycling.180 In fact, however, there are
various conditions that reduce or eliminate the incidence of cycling,
but, short of complete agreement, most have less to do with shared
preferences with respect to outcomes than they do with shared
dimensions upon which those preferences may be arrayed.181 Indeed,
if anything, it turns out that placing two constituencies with
oppositional interests within the same electorate (say, shareholders
and employees) may be the best way to reduce the incidence of
cyclical outcomes because preferences would polarize across a
shared dimension of capital and labor.182
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The third procedural argument for the exclusive shareholder
franchise is also undercut by the revelation of shareholder diversity.
The argument, remember, is that shareholders alone have a very
good proxy for the degree of their interest in the firm, the number
of shares owned, which allows us to perfectly calibrate their voting
power.183 But the number of shares owned is not such a good proxy
once we have shareholders with interests that go beyond the mere
monetary value of their stock. There are bigger problems with this
argument, however, than the fact that one of its assumptions—
shareholder homogeneity—has been undercut.
The biggest problem is that a ready proxy for shareholder inter-
est and the one share, one vote rule tells us little about whether or
how voting power should be distributed among stakeholders. The
number of shares owned by particular shareholders may be a good
indication of their interest in comparison to other shareholders; it
tells us nothing, however, about their interest in comparison to, say,
an employee, a creditor, or a customer. More specifically, it is not an
independent reason to conclude that the present arrangement,
which gives shareholders alone the right to vote, is any better at
capturing the preferences of interested parties than, say, giving
employees alone the right to vote and capturing everyone else’s
interest through contract. The difficulty in assessing how much to
weight the aggregate shareholder interest or vote against the
aggregate interests of any other group of stakeholders runs both
ways and does not demand resolution in any particular direction.
Perhaps a simpler way to think about this point is in terms of a
board with members who represent different constituencies.184 On
an eleven-member corporate board that represents the interests of
many different stakeholders, the fact that one group of stakeholders
has a particularly nuanced way of apportioning voting power
amongst its own members tells us nothing about how many board
representatives that group should be apportioned as a whole. That
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is, the one share, one vote rule is a good way of apportioning voting
power among shareholders, but it tells us nothing about how voting
power should be distributed among different stakeholders.
This is not to say that the presence of an effective measure of
stakeholder interest is irrelevant to determining whether any par-
ticular group of stakeholders receives the right to vote. Distribution
of a corporate franchise operates, at one level, like that of a political
franchise. Voting is a collective decision-making process designed to
reflect preferences of those interested in the outcome of an election.
For that reason, we usually tie the right to vote to the strength of
one’s preferences in the election.185 Because we have no direct meth-
od of observing people’s preferences, we are forced to rely on various
proxies for the strength of their interest.186 In the political arena, we
historically relied upon property holding and taxpaying require-
ments as proxies for voter interest; we now use residency and
citizenship requirements for much the same reason.187 Because the
presence of a good proxy for voter interest is central to the issue of
the scope of the franchise, the fact that shareholders have a pretty
good proxy for interest is an appropriate factor to consider when
doling out corporate voting rights.
But, again, the fact that we have a good proxy for shareholder
interest does not mean that we lack good proxies for other corporate
constituents, or that shareholders, therefore, should receive all of
the voting power. When assessing proxies for voter interest, we are
usually looking for two things: does the proxy accurately capture
voter interest, and is the proxy manageable.188 Shares are a rela-
tively accurate, manageable proxy for shareholder interest, and
therefore, shareholders are a group whose interests can be rea-
sonably captured through voting (rather than merely through
some other device, like contract).189 Employees are another group.
Employment status is a good proxy: it is a good indication of interest
in corporate decision making, and employees are pretty easy to
identify. But there may not be good proxies for all corporate con-
stituents. It may be difficult, for example, to devise an accurate,
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manageable proxy for customer interest in a retail firm. Any
individual customer’s interest in the firm may be irregular and it
may be hard to identify the customers before they become interested
parties (and make, or decide not to make, a purchase). For that
reason, individual contracts may be the best way to capture their
interests.190 The presence of a good voting proxy for one group of
constituents has little bearing to the decision to extend the franchise
to any other group; those decisions can, and should, be made
independently.
The final, substantive argument for the exclusive shareholder
franchise was that more diverse constituents, if granted the vote,
would pursue their own special interests to the detriment of others
in their group or, more generally, other stakeholders; shareholders,
with their common interests, would not.191 Once again, before
examining how this argument fares without the assumption of
shareholder homogeneity, we should examine it on its own terms.
The premise—that democratic processes may allow a majority to
exploit minority interests—is well known.192 The conclusion, though,
is a bit perverse. The presence of a tyrannical majority is usually
offered in support of structures designed to protect the exploited
minority; here, though, it is offered as a reason for pushing the
minority group out of the decision process altogether. That is, in
such situations, we are usually worried about the exploitation of the
minority interest, not the possibility that the majority or their
representatives will feel put upon by having to consider interests
other than their own.
This is not to say that tyranny of the majority is not an issue. It
is an issue with corporate governance as it is with any democratic
decision procedure. Most political democracies attempt to blunt the
effects of what the founders called “faction” by making a system of
government less responsive to the electorate and providing sub-
stantive protections to minorities.193 The same approach is taken in
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corporate law, where there are many layers between shareholders
and most corporate decision making and various protections for
minority shareholders.194 Minority shareholders in closely held
corporations, for example, enjoy wide-ranging equitable protections
through the “minority oppression” doctrine.195 Minority shareholders
in publicly held corporations are protected by the fiduciary duty of
loyalty, which prevents the majority shareholder from pushing
through lopsided self-interested transactions that harm the corpor-
ation as whole.196 Such protections are a rational response to the
possibility of an exploitive majority faction; eliminating minority
interests from the corporate electorate just adds insult to injury.
Once shareholder diversity enters the picture, this argument, like
the others, makes even less sense. The claim again comes down to
one of relative diversity and the assumption that any marginal
increase in the diversity of the electorate militates in favor of a less
responsive system and restrictions on the scope of the electorate. In
corporate governance, as in politics, there are many reasons to
embrace more deliberative systems of governance. Some of those
reasons have to do with the cost of more responsive systems—
putting every single corporate decision to a vote of an electorate,
however defined, is a waste of time and money. Some of those
reasons have to do with the heterogeneity of the electorate and the
worry that permanent or even temporary majorities may pursue
their own interests to the detriment of a minority.197
But, in such cases, it takes only a slight departure from complete
homogeneity to push in favor of a less responsive system of gover-
nance. For example, even shareholders who are completely unani-
mous in their support of maximizing shareholder value may still
disagree on, say, the time frame for that, and thus may want to
pursue very different strategies.198 In an overly responsive system,
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a tyrannical majority may be able to exploit a minority given this,
or really any, differentiation in preference profiles. As discussed
above, this has already been recognized and built into corporate
governance systems in the form of board duties and other devices.199
The recent recognition that shareholder interests are actually more
diverse than once theorized doesn’t really add that much more
weight to arguments for less responsive systems. Most of the
arguments in favor of a less responsive system, such as the costs
and potential for exploitation, apply regardless of the exact level of
diversity within the electorate.
So, in sum, what does increased shareholder diversity mean for
the scope of the electorate or, more to the point, the exclusive
shareholder franchise? Unlike the arguments for a more deliberate
system, the arguments for a less expansive electorate, at least the
ones based on shareholder homogeneity, were not very good to begin
with. But even if we take them at face value, shareholder heteroge-
neity undercuts one of their critical assumptions. That is, to the
extent that shareholders now have diverse interests, they are more
prone to inefficient squabbling; more likely to produce damaging
voting cycles; in better position to exploit their differences; and the
one share, one vote system is less well-calibrated to their interests.
Scholars attempt to salvage these claims by hanging them on the
relative homogeneity of shareholder interests, but the claims are not
fine-tuned enough to turn on these new, largely theoretical differ-
ences in preference profiles. Instead, shareholder diversity just
makes these bad arguments worse.
So we are left with slightly stronger arguments for a less re-
sponsive governance structure and increasingly poorer arguments
for the exclusive shareholder franchise (arguments that, for the
most part, came out of shareholder primacy positions to begin with).
To a large degree, this occurs because preference homogeneity, or
the lack thereof, is viewed as having an equivalent effect on both the
ideal level of board responsiveness and the composition of the board
electorate. It does not.
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C. Board Primacy and the Corporate “Good”
As time has proven shareholder preferences to be not quite as
homogenous as envisioned, board primacists have continued to
distance the decision-making processes from the shareholder
electorate.200 This push is consistent with the civic republican
impulse of board primacy theorists to insulate decision makers from
the whims of the electorate. An insulated board is in a better
position to deliberate and reach decisions that advance the interest
of the firm. But when it comes to defining the electorate, the very
thing that makes such deliberation valuable—the clash of different
interests and opinions, the pull and haul of politics—is viewed as so
troublesome that voting must be limited to a single group of
constituents.
The strange thing about this is that many public-choice style
corporate scholars, firmly entrenched in the law and economics
tradition, begin to look like civic republicans when faced with
preference profiles that troubled them. They moved from wanting
to aggregate voter preferences to wanting some distance between
voters and their representatives.201 But what, exactly, is their sense
of the corporate good? It is here that we see the strange feature of
this move in the direction of board primacy. It is civic republicanism
without any sense of what counts as the public good; or, to be more
precise, not much accountability to any of the constituents besides
shareholders who make up that public. Where does the sense of the
corporate, or public, good come from? And how does the system of
governance keep the corporate board honest in its duty to pursue
those ends?
Those are questions that board primacy theorists have trouble
answering. Shareholder primacy dictates that both the corporate
and public good are best pursued by maximizing shareholder
wealth.202 Within that framework, there may be debates about the
best means of achieving that maximization, but the ends are agreed
upon. Bainbridge fits within this category. Even though he has set
up his “director primacy” theory in opposition to shareholder
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primacy, he still believes that shareholder wealth maximization
is the proper corporate purpose.203 His debates with shareholder
primacists such as Lucian Bebchuk revolve around the best means
for pursuing these agreed upon ends.
However, other board primacists have difficulty in establishing
the corporate good and the board’s connection to it. Blair and Stout
give a perfectly respectable answer as to corporate purpose: the
board is supposed to be advancing the interests of all corporate
constituents and needs to be somewhat insulated in order to do that
(as to not be dominated, at a minimum, by shareholder interests).204
The directors are viewed as the “independent hierarchs” serving
the interests of the corporation, which “can be understood as a
joint welfare function of all the individuals who make firm-specific
investments and agree to participate in the extracontractual, in-
ternal mediation process within the firm.”205 The list of possible
individuals may include executives, employees, and shareholders,
as well as creditors and even a local community.206 But when it
comes to the composition of the electorate that will, ultimately,
make the board accountable to all parties, they oddly fall back upon
some of the arguments that turn on shareholder homogeneity, like
the argument from politics and the argument from Arrow’s theorem,
to argue for an exclusive shareholder electorate.207
This is a strange turn for several reasons. Initially, it seems to
run against the rest of their theory, which views the board as acting
on behalf of all corporate constituents. On this front, the best they
can do is argue that the exclusive shareholder franchise is not
inconsistent with the rest of their theory, which is true, but it is
certainly not dictated by it.208 Moreover, we are left with the
question of why a board elected by shareholders alone would feel
any pressure to act on behalf of all corporate constituents. True,
board members are relatively insulated from shareholders, but with
this scheme, they are even more insulated from other constituents.
And although it may be true that most board decisions advance or
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the other, because when all interests line up, then shareholders
have no special claim to representation. It is one thing to say that
the board should act on behalf of all corporate stakeholders, but it
is unclear why they actually would.
The history of corporate constituency status should be instructive
here. Thirty-one states have provisions that permit directors to take
the needs of all corporate constituencies into account when making
certain decisions.209 Some constituency statutes apply only to
change-in-control transactions, while others apply more broadly to
all board decisions.210 The purpose of these statutes is to give
directors the freedom to consider the impact of a board decision on
stakeholders other than shareholders.211 However, most commenta-
tors generally recognize that constituency statutes fail to provide
any meaningful incentive to the board to actually consider all
constituencies.212 The statutes merely provide authorization to
consider these broader sets of needs; they provide no sanction for
failing to do so.213 Directors are not legally accountable to any of the
stakeholders for failure to consider the decision’s impact on their
group.214 Instead, directors can use constituency statutes as a “fig
leaf” for decisions that are in their own interest.215 Even those who
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have supported constituency statutes have deep concerns about
this lack of accountability.216
Blair and Stout’s model suffers from a similar flaw in its incentive
structure. Directing a board to consider the interests of various
members of the team does not mean that they will do so. Blair and
Stout argue that corporate law provides for such discretion, and
much of their argument is a positive one.217 However, to the extent
they are making a normative case for the team production model, it
is difficult to see where team members other that shareholders
would have any leverage over the board or input into its composi-
tion. Although they acknowledge that exclusive shareholder voting
rights “pose[ ] something of a problem for the mediating hierarch
approach,”218 they make two arguments attempting to reconcile this
anomaly. First, they argue that shareholders may have the best
preferences for serving the corporation as a whole.219 As discussed
above,220 they argue that shareholder homogeneity provides for a
cleaner electorate with “fewer pathologies.”221 Because of this,
shareholders serve as the best possible electorate for serving the
interests of the corporation as a whole.222 Second, they argue that
shareholder voting rights may be “partial compensation for share-
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holders’ unique vulnerabilities.”223 These arguments are contra-
dictory, of course; in one, the shareholders are acting as repre-
sentatives for all stakeholders, while in the other they are using the
vote to protect themselves against other stakeholders. Blair and
Stout ultimately dismiss such concerns, however, by hearkening
back to the relative impotence of the shareholder franchise.224 One
wonders why they did not further consider the possibility of
expanding the electorate to include other team members.225
The long-term theorists have not laid out their model as clearly
as Blair and Stout, and thus it is more difficult to pinpoint where
exactly they fit on the spectrum. Their chief problem with share-
holder primacy seems to be its endemic short-term focus (although
shareholder primacists themselves would dispute that the model is
short-sighted).226 Lipton and Rosenblum want corporations to focus
on long-term success, and they emphasize that corporations need to
“realign[ ] ... the interests of stockholders and corporations around
the long-term health of the business enterprise.”227 However, they
do not differentiate between the communal stakeholder success
emphasized by Blair and Stout and the long-term shareholder
wealth maximization that others such as Bainbridge would endorse.
Instead, they seem to imply (at least under our reading) that long-
term success would benefit both shareholders and other stake-
holders equally.228 While their quinquennial board would still be
elected solely by shareholders,229 Lipton and Rosenblum seem to
advocate the “we’re all in this together” model, rather than a long-
term, but otherwise traditional, shareholder primacy norm.
Mitchell presents a more complicated case. Like Lipton and
Rosenblum, Mitchell is most aggrieved by the short-term focus
2010] SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY 2117
230. See MITCHELL, supra note 9, at 3.
231. See id. at 111-12.
232. See, e.g., id. at 4-6.
233. Id. at 20-27.
234. Id. at 47-48 (comparing corporations to the sharks from the film Deep Blue Sea and
noting that “the sharks ran amok threatening anyone that might come in their path”).
235. Id. at 132.
236. Id. at 112.
237. Id. at 130-31.
238. Id.
239. Bainbridge, In Defense, supra note 51, at 1423-25, 1442-43.
induced by shareholder control.230 Thus, his main concern is
separating the board from short-term shareholder influence.231 But
Mitchell also seems concerned about the cost in externalities
generated by a share-price maximization norm, whether it be short-
or long-term.232 Mitchell opens his book, Corporate Irresponsibility,
with tales of massive layoffs, forced labor, product defects, and a
corporate restructuring that harmed debtholders.233 He criticizes the
singular corporate focus on share price so strongly that he ulti-
mately compares this focus to that of genetically-engineered man-
eating sharks.234
Given his concern about share-price maximization and corpo-
rate externalities, Mitchell seems less interested than Lipton and
Rosenblum in ever getting shareholder input. In fact, as he puts
it, “[m]aking directors accountable to constituencies with specific
interests will lead them to favor those interests unless the incentive
structures to do so are broken.”235 Thus his initial and favorite pro-
posal is for a self-perpetuating board.236 When it comes to the
quinquennial election proposal, Mitchell is open to the possibility of
including other stakeholders in the electorate.237 However, Mitchell
only briefly entertains this idea before noting that he does not want
to “thoroughly develop” the proposal.238 Like the others, Mitchell
does not follow the logic of his concerns out to the composition of the
corporate electorate.
Bainbridge is at least more consistent here, wholeheartedly
importing the idea that corporate actions should be directed at
increasing shareholder wealth, and thus making the board answer,
albeit weakly, to a shareholder electorate.239 But Bainbridge is
making the familiar mistake of assuming he knows what it is that
shareholders want. He does not seem to care what shareholders
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actually want in particular circumstances; instead, he is content to
make “shareholder wealth maximization” the constant and easily
implemented goal of the board.240 He avoids the messiness of actual
elections by assuming that boards will act in what he considered to
be the best interests of the electorate.241
Of course, as we have discussed in an earlier project, it is unclear
what, exactly, it means to maximize the wealth of a shareholder
electorate with a very diverse set of preferences.242 Some sharehold-
ers will desire short-term share price maximization, while others
will prefer long-term dividend maximization.243 Some may have
different ideas about the best way of pursuing wealth maxi-
mization.244 Others still will desire to maximize their overall utility
by advocating for corporate activity that promotes social welfare
goals.245 Elections can be useful devices for sorting out these various
preferences into results that best map onto the preferences of the
electorate.246
Thus, directing a relatively unresponsive board to maximize
shareholder wealth gives them, at best, incomplete guidance. The
only way to make it more complete is by building a system of
governance that responds in some way to the actual preferences of
shareholders. The problem with Bainbridge’s argument is that just
as the governance system should be getting more responsive to
shareholder interests, he argues that it should be less responsive.247
What we are left with is a vision of shareholder “wealth” that bears
less and less of a relationship to the well-being of actual sharehold-
ers.
So why should we expect a less responsive board to better manage
this diverse set of interests? For Bainbridge, as for Blair and Stout,
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the answer is that corporate boards can be trusted to pursue proper
ends.248 But Bainbridge goes a step further than Blair and Stout’s
notion of the board as a group of “meditating hierarchs”249 con-
strained by norms of trust: for Bainbridge, “the corporation’s board
of directors in fact is a Platonic Guardian.”250
Such a claim would ordinarily be laughable, or accepted as a
reductio ad absurdum of the whole board primacy project, if it
weren’t delivered with such seriousness (and so often). The resort to
describing directors as Platonic Guardians is a complete surrender
of any workable notion of what directors should be doing or why
they would be expected to do it. We can’t rely on philosopher kings
to act as directors of our corporations for the same reason we can’t
rely on them to run our governments: Platonic Guardians do not
exist. For that reason, we tend to favor more democratic decision
structures with a little more accountability to the electorate.
Corporate constituents, other than shareholders, were never
viewed as the proper board electorate in large part because their
preferences were so heterogeneous. Now that shareholders are
known to be more like those other constituents, they, despite
holding onto the franchise, are to be further distanced from the
board. This leaves the board in a curious position—it must pursue
the corporate good, but is not accountable to many of its constitu-
ents and is only weakly accountable to shareholders. The resultant
corporate board, as Bearle and Means pointed out over seventy-five
years ago, ends up resembling a communist committee of commis-
sars:
The communist thinks of the community in terms of a state; the
corporation director thinks of it in terms of an enterprise; and
though this difference between the two may well lead to a
radical divergence in results, it still remains true that the
corporation director who would subordinate the interests of the
individual stockholder to those of the group more nearly
resembles the communist in mode of thought than he does the
protagonist of private property.251
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At least the commissars, though, had a well-defined notion of the
public good.
D. The Road Less Taken: Other Constituencies into Corporate
Governance
While a push in the direction of board primacy may be one
possible response to the news of shareholder heterogeneity, there is
a second way to frame the issue. With respect to their preference
profiles, shareholders are more like other corporate constituents
than once thought. Instead of focusing on the fact that shareholders
are now as “bad” as other constituents for the purposes of corporate
governance, we could view this as evidence that the other constitu-
ents are just as “good” as shareholders, at least in this respect. That
is, the breakdown of this particular distinction between sharehold-
ers and other constituents could mean that we should treat the
other constituents more like shareholders rather than the other way
around.
Such a change in treatment could be taken in many different
directions, but one of the most obvious, since shareholder homogene-
ity is most frequently put forward in support of their exclusive
franchise, would be to expand corporate voting systems to include
other constituents. To be sure, there are arguments for the exclusive
shareholder franchise that do not rely on an assumption of share-
holder homogeneity. Blair and Stout, for example, argue for a
shareholder electorate because shareholders are more vulnerable
than other constituents.252 And there are certainly other consider-
ations that go into any discussion of the corporate franchise.253 It
may be difficult, for example, to come up with an accurate and
manageable way of identifying specific members of a constituency,
like customers, for an election. But the breakdown of the fundamen-
tal distinction between shareholders and other constituents should
at least force a reexamination of the scope of the corporate fran-
chise.
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CONCLUSION
Over the last several years, it has become clear that one of the
basic assumptions of corporate governance theory—that share-
holders have a homogeneous interest in wealth maximization—is
simply not true. Shareholders, it turns out, are much like other
corporate constituents in that they have a wide range of preferences
with respect to the corporation and its decision making. This
discovery has moved many corporate scholars, especially board
primacy theorists, to argue for further distance between the board
and the shareholder electorate. These scholars, many of whom come
out of a public choice, aggregative approach to decision making,
have begun to look more like civic republicans, arguing for a more
insulated governing body. But this leaves them in a curious
position—they are civic republicans but do not have any real sense
of the corporate good and, more pointedly, they lack any way to tie
their sense of the corporate good to the actual preferences of their
preferred constituents.
There is, however, another potential path to explore in response
to the news of shareholder diversity. We now know that other
corporate constituents are more like shareholders, at least when it
comes to preference diversity, than once believed. This undercuts
one of the critical assumptions of many arguments for the exclusive
shareholder franchise. That said, scholars have either left this issue
alone or attempted to reformulate the arguments to hang on the
relative homogeneity of shareholder preferences. This approach,
however, is misguided, in large part because it conflates two very
different concepts in a system of governance: responsiveness and the
identity of the electorate.
